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This paper analyzes the impact of remittances sent by altruistic migrants on the labor 
supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with asymmetric 
information about the residents' real economic situation. The optimal transfer depends 
on wages of both the donor and the recipient. Residents subject to a good economic 
situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to 
manipulate remitters' expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the 
transferred amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are 
victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect 
information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically 
cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity. 
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L'article étudie l'impact des transferts monétaires effectués par les migrants vers les 
pays d'origine sur l'offre de travail des résidents. Si les derniers ont la possibilité de 
manipuler les anticipations des migrants, les migrants peuvent réduire le montant du 
transfert, pénalisant ainsi les résidents les plus démunis. 
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of remittances sent by altruistic migrants on the labor supply of residents.
The model is cast as a two-period game with asymmetric information about the residents’ real economic
situation. The optimal transfer depends on wages of both the donor and the recipient. Residents subject
to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to
manipulate remitters’ expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the transferred amount
accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook,
are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their
type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity.
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Often the decision to migrate from a developing to a developed country is guided by economic
considerations; in general, migrants are able to get better economic opportunities in the host
country than at home. The left home relatives may also beneﬁt from the migrants’ successful
integration. Indeed, once they found a job abroad, migrants tend to send a signiﬁcant part
of their income to their families back home. Over the past ﬁfteen years, international migrant
remittances have become increasingly prominent - exceeding $232 billion in 2005, with more than
70% of this amount going to developing countries. In 2004, remittances were the second largest
source of external ﬁnancing of the developing world after foreign direct investment, and amounted
to more than twice the size of oﬃcial aid.
Such a substantial amount of external funding must have an impact on the macroeconomic equi-
librium of developing countries. Several authors studied the impact of remittances on inequalities
and poverty in receiving countries (Adams, 2006; Adams and Page 2005; Lopez-Cordoba, 2004;
Adams, 2004). They show that remittances contributed to ﬁghting poverty (measured by the
account index) and especially to reducing the “depth of poverty” (measured by the poverty gap
index) and the “severity of poverty” (measured by the squared poverty gap).
While this positive eﬀect on poverty reduction should not be underemphasized, remittances
may also bring about some unpleasant consequences. In particular, remittances can create income
dependency by undermining recipients’ incentives to work, which, in turn, would slow down eco-
nomic growth. The usual suspect for such a disappointing outcome is the asymmetric information
between the remitter and the recipient. For instance, Chami et al. (2003) analyze the impact of
remittances when the resident, who gets these resources, is able to hide his eﬀort to the remitter.
In their model, the migrant is altruistic: his utility depends on the utility of his left home family.
They shows that remittances bring about two contradictory eﬀects: on the one hand, an increase
in remittances will reduce recipients’ work eﬀort because they become less concerned about the
risk of getting a small income from work; on the other hand, ﬁrms react to additional opportunism
by increasing the dispersion of wages in order to stimulate work eﬀort. Since the feed-back eﬀect
1cannot oﬀset the direct one, remittances have a negative net impact on output.1 Azam and
Gubert (2005) analyze the migration of a family member as part of a diversiﬁcation strategy that
seeks to protect households from income uncertainty speciﬁc to agricultural production. Residents
are assumed to get remittances only if their income falls below a given threshold. The authors
highlight a moral hazard problem: households that can receive remittances tend to decrease their
work eﬀort, thus the probability that the output falls below the critical threshold increases.
This paper analyses the impact of remittances on recipients’ labor supply in the presence of
moral hazard. The model is cast as a two-period game between a migrant who makes a transfer and
a resident who beneﬁts of the transfer, given asymmetric information about the real situation of
the recipient. Both the migrant and the resident maximize their intertemporal utility. The model
builds on the classical signaling methodology developed by Spence (1973).2 As in the paper by
Chami et al. (2003), migrants are altruistic: their utility depends to some extent on the resident’s
utility. By contrast, in our model income from work is endogenous: residents and migrants are
subject to an elementary leisure/consumption trade-oﬀ that determines their hour supply. The
optimal working time depends on their wages and other autonomous gains, including remittances.
The migrant’s wage is common knowledge: he is supposed to be paid the same wage as other
(migrant) workers in the same sector, which is public information in developed countries. On the
other hand, the resident’s wage is private information. The migrant observes the resident’s working
hours during the ﬁrst period; he can use this information to upgrade his expectations about the
recipient’s wage. This sequence of decisions opens the door for manipulating information: the
resident subject to a good economic situation can behave as if he were in a bad situation only
in order to make the donor believe that he is doing badly, and extract more remittances. In
an equilibrium with manipulation, when the resident works only a small amount of hours, the
migrant cannot tell without ambiguity whether he made this choice because he gets a small wage
or because he is trying to manipulate him. Given this uncertainty, the migrant will chose a smaller
1 This formalization is much in line with those used in models of altruistic transfers within families (Barro, 1974;
Becker, 1974; Laferrère and Wolﬀ, 2006; and especially Gatti, 2000).
2 See also Spence (2001) and Vickers (1986). The model chosen here is close to that developed by Besancenot
and Vranceanu (2005).
2amount of remittances as compared to the perfect information set-up. As an upshot of all these,
imperfect information imposes a real cost on recipients who really are victims of a poor economic
outlook. To avoid this outcome, they can choose to signal their type by strongly reducing their
working hours during the ﬁrst period. Consequently, their income precarity edges up, and output
in the receiving country declines accordingly.
One interesting feature of this model is its ability to describe the complex relationship between
the level of remittances and the migrant’s wage in case of asymmetric information: on the one
hand, a raise in the migrant’s wage implies an increase in the amount of remittances, and, on
the other hand, the more acute moral hazard problem calls for a reduction in the amount of
remittances. So far this link between remittances and the wage of the migrant (not the resident)
has not been emphasized by existing analyses.3
The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section introduces the basic assumptions and the
rule of the game. Section 2 analyses the equilibrium when an explicit signaling strategy cannot be
implemented. Section 3 comments on the welfare properties of the hybrid equilibrium and analyses
the relationship between the migrant’s wage and the level of remittances. Section 4 studies the
equilibrium when the resident subject to a poor economic is able to signal his type by drastically
cutting working hours. The ﬁnal section presents the conclusion.
2 Main assumptions
The problem is cast as a game between the migrant (or remitter) and the resident. The two agents
live over two periods: the ﬁrst period starts at time t =1and ends at time t =2 , the second
starts at time t =2and ends at time t =3 4 . Thereafter, the two periods will be denoted by index
t, which represents the beginning of each period (t ∈ {1,2}). To keep formalization as simple as
possible, we assume that during each time period, the two agents consume all of their available
resources (i.e., they do not save). Both the migrant and the resident have a job: their income
from work depends on their wages and working hours. In addition, the migrant is altruistic: at
3 Empirical studies on migrations from agricultural to urban areas of the same country have analyzed the
relationship between the migrant wage and the resources transferred to the left home family, without reaching a
clear cut conclusion (Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Rempel and Lobdell, 1978; Hoddinott, 1994).
4 The migrant and the resident can for example be a couple, with one emigrating and the other left at home.
3the beginning of the second period, he commits to remitting part of his income to the resident,
depending on his own income and on his perceived economic situation of the resident.
Let s denote the wage of the migrant and let wi denote the resident’s wage. Total working
time will be normalized to unity, hence s and wi should be interpreted as the one-period wage
income to be obtained by a worker who would work the maximum working time.
While the migrant’s wage is public information, the resident’s wage is private information. In
order to keep the problem as simple as possible, we assume that the resident’s economic situation
can be either good, and then he gets a (H)igh wage, wi = wH, or bad, and then he gets a (L)ow
wage, wi = wL, with wL <w H and wH <s .
At the beginning of the game (t =1 ) , the migrant does not know the recipient’s real economic
situation, but knows the probability of occurrence of the good (or the bad) economic situation. Let
Pr[wH] denote his prior subjective probability that the resident gets a high wage, and Pr[wL]=
1 − Pr[wH] the prior subjective probability that the resident gets a low wage. In order to keep
t h ep r o b l e ms i m p l e ,w ea s s u m et h a tPr[wH]=P r [ wL]=0 .5.5
• The basic sequence of decisions goes as follows:
-A tt =1 , at the very beginning of the ﬁrst period, Nature chooses the resident’s wage, either
wL or wH;
- Right after, an exogenously given public aid A is granted to the resident for the period in
progress;
- Finally, the resident and the migrant each decide how much they want to work during the
ﬁrst period (h1 and τ1 respectively).
-A tt =2 , at the beginning of the last period, the migrant has observed the resident’s working
hours during the ﬁrst period (h1). He can then upgrade his beliefs about the resident’s economic
situation;
- Right after, he commits on the amount of remittances T he will send to the resident to replace
the public aid.6 He also decides on his own working hours during the second period, τ2;
5 Any other values could be considered, provided that Pr[wH] ∈]0,1[.
6 In an alternative formulation, remittances could be added to public aid. The structure of the problem structure
4- Finally, the resident receives the remittances and reveals his real economic situation by
choosing his working hours, h2; the game is over.
• The two players’ objectives.
a. The resident
At each period t ∈ {1,2},t h eresident’s one period utility is:
Ut = U(ct,h t)=ct(1 − ht), (1)
where ct denotes the resident’s consumption; the maximum duration of work is standardized to
the unit and ht denotes the resident’s working hours.7
Let R denote the resident’s non-earned income. His budget constraint is:
ct = wiht + Rt, with i ∈ {L,H} (2)
where, during the ﬁrst period, the non-earned income is public aid, R1 = A and, during the
second period, the non-earned income is the amount remitted by the migrant, R2 = T.We assume
thereafter that A<w L: public aid is lower than the income of a resident who would work the
maximum working time (normalized here to 1) and is paid the low wage. (This plausible constraint
will allows us to rule out a negative labor supply.)
The resident’s intertemporal utility Z can be written simply using an additive form:8
Z = U1 + U2 = U(c1,h 1)+U(c2,h 2). (3)
b. The migrant
Let xt denote the migrant’s consumption, and we denoted by τt his working hours during
period t. We assume that his elementary leisure/consumption preferences are the same as the
resident’s; we thus can deﬁne the utility he derives from consumption and work by:
V (xt,τt)=xt(1 − τt). (4)
would not change, but the formula would be unnecessarily complicated.
7 The Cobb-Douglas function conveys in a simple way the neoclassic assumptions about the convexity of
leisure/consumption preferences.
8 The problem would not change much if we introduce a discount factor.
5The migrant is altruistic, so his total utility depends to some extent on the resident’s utility. This
assumption leads us to deﬁne the migrant’s one-period utility Wt:
Wt = W(xt,τt,c t,h t)=[ V (xt,τt)]
(1−β) [U(ct,h t)]
β (5)
where β denotes the degree of altruism, with β ∈ [0,1]. When β =0 , the migrant is selﬁsh: the
resident’s welfare does not matter to him. For β>0, the migrant can be said to be altruist.
The migrant also seeks to maximize his intertemporal utility Σ. It takes an additive form:
Σ = W1 + W2 =[ V (x1,τ1)]
(1−β) [U(c1,h 1)]
β +[ V (x2,τ2)]
(1−β) [U(c2,h 2)]
β . (6)
Finally, for t ∈ {1,2}, the migrant’s budget constraint is:
xt = sτt + Bt (7)
with his non-earned incomes B1 =0and B2 = −T ;d u r i n gt h eﬁrst period, the migrant receives
no exogenous income and, during the second period, he transfers resources to the resident.
• The players’ strategies
The resident seeks to maximize Z, the migrant seeks to maximize Σ.
The resident’s strategy (Sr) can be represented by his choice of working hours at each period,
given his wage (which is private information): Sr(i)={(h1,h 2)|wi, with i ∈ {H,L}}.
The migrant decides how much he is going to remit (T) and how long he is going to work
during the two periods (τ1 and τ2), given his income and his expectations about the resident’s
wage. At the beginning of the game, the migrant’s beliefs are given. The migrant’s hours supply
during the ﬁrst period (τ1) is independent from the resident’s behavior. At the beginning of the
second period, the migrant chooses his remittances and working hours for the second period (τ2)
after having observed the resident’s working hours (during the ﬁrst period). Any forecasting error
implies an (ex-post) utility loss for the migrant. Thus, his strategy (Sm) is made up of his rational
guess about the resident’s wage; at t =1his expectations build on his prior beliefs, and at t =2 ,
his expectations take into account the resident’s working hours during the ﬁrst period, h1. In a
6compact form, we can write: Sm =( E[wi|I1],E[wi|I2]) where E[−] is the expectation operator
and It is the information set at time t, with t ∈ {1,2}.9
A Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a situation in which the resident’s strategy Sr maximizes
his utility given the migrant’s beliefs, and the migrant’s beliefs Sm are correct given the optimal
strategy of the resident. In the following, we will analyze only equilibrium situations. Thus,
notations can be simpliﬁed if we state, according to the rational expectation hypothesis, that
objective and subjective probabilities are the same (at t =1and t =2 ) .
In the next Section we analyze the equilibrium of the game when the resident subject to a bad
economic situation cannot signal his type by undercutting working hours below the lowest working
time that would prevail with perfect information, i.e. cannot recourse to strategic signaling. This
a s s u m p t i o nw i l lb er e l a x e di nS e c t i o n5 . I tw i l lt h e nb es h o w nt h a ti ns o m ec a s e s ,e v e ni ft h e
resident can signal his type by drastically reducing his working hours, he will not choose to do so
because this strategy is dominated. Therefore, the equilibrium developed in the next section is
not only an interesting benchmark, but has its own economic meaning.
3 Equilibrium without strategic signaling
3.1 The resident’s choice of working hours during the last period
Following the standard methodology, this sequential game is solved by backward induction. At
the beginning of the second period the resident has already received the remittances T. Thus, he
can decide his optimal working hours hi
2, given his wage wi, without any strategic consideration.
To determine his optimal working hours during the second period, the resident maximizes his
















, with i ∈ {H,L}. (8)
9 In this simple problem, at the outset of the game the expected value of resident’s wage is: E[wi|I1]=
Pr[wH]wH +P r [ wL]wL =0 .5(wH + wL).
7The resident’s second-period labor supply increases with his wage and decreases with the amount
remitted.
Finally, replacing the expression of his labor supply in the utility function, we can write
the resident’s indirect second-period utility as a function of his wage and remittances: U∗
2 =






with i ∈ {H,L}. (9)
3.2 The migrant’s choice of remitted amount and working hours during
the last period
At the beginning of the second period (t =2 ), the ﬁrst-period migrant’s utility (W1) has already
been realized. Therefore his decision problem of maximizing Σ = W1 + W2 is truncated: his
choices will have an impact only on his second-period utility. Hence, he is concerned only about
maximizing W2. G i v e nt h a th ed o e sn o tk n o wt h er e s i d e n t ’ sw a g e ,h ed e c i d e so nt h ea m o u n to f
remittances according to his wage estimate, which depends on the information available at the
beginning of the second period (I2). The expected wage was denoted by E[wi|I2].
The migrant must take into account the fact that once the resident gets his remittances, he
is going to decide his second-period working hours such as to maximize his utility. Hence the
migrant’s optimal choice takes the form of a standard Stackelberg decision problem (where the
migrant is the "leader" and the resident is the "follower"). Let E[U∗
2|I2] denote the migrant’s
estimate of the resident’s utility maximum, given his expectations about the resident’s wage (Eq









with (1) : x2 = sτ2 − T













where the constraint (1) is the second-period budget constraint and (2) is the indirect utility of
the resident as expected by the migrant.
To solve the problem, we carry out necessary substitutions and denote by ω2 the logarithm of
8W2:














































The amount remitted decreases with the resident’s wage (as anticipated by the migrant) and
increases with the migrant’s wage and degree of altruism. In addition, our problem implies that
T ∗ ≥ 0 (remittances cannot be negative ). Thereafter, to keep the analysis as simple as possible,
we will assume thereafter that, whatever the resident’s wage, the optimal amount remitted is













, i.e. wH,w h i c h
implies:
βs− (1 − β)wH > 0 ⇔ β>ˆ β ≡
wH
s + wH . (14)
Within our analysis framework, the existence of remittances thus implies a minimum degree of
altruism. From now on, we will assume that β>ˆ β (since s>w H, as u ﬃcient but not necessary
condition is β>0.5).


















93.3 How is E [wi|I2] determined knowing h1?
Notice that when there is perfect information about his wage, the resident cannot aim at ma-
nipulating expectations, and must choose his ﬁrst-period working hours with the only objective
of maximizing his ﬁrst-period utility (U1 = U(c1,h 1)), given his ﬁrst-period budget constraint
c1 = A + wih1. The resident’s optimal working hours would then simply be hi
1 =0 .5(1 − A/wi).















In this ﬁrst part of the analysis, we assumed that the resident cannot undercut working hours
belowhL









At the beginning of the game, information available to the migrant about the resident’s eco-
nomic situation is summarized by his prior beliefs: Pr[wH]=P r [ wL]=0 .5.
At the beginning of the second period, the migrant knows the resident’s working hours during














Remember that the amount remitted decreases with the resident’s expected wage. Thus, when
the resident’s economic situation is truly bad, he has no incentive to behave as is his situation was
good (by choosing hi
1 = hH
1 ), because, not only he incurs a ﬁrst period utility loss, but also he
will get a smaller amount of remittances. On the other hand, if he gets the high wage, in case of
asymmetric information, the resident may decide to work less as if his wage were low, in order to
make the migrant believe that he is in a bad economic situation. In that case, the migrant would
remit a higher amount and the resident’s second-period utility might be higher. Let q denote the
share of residents who choose this manipulating strategy.10 The migrant’s beliefs c a nt h e nb e
10 Or, alternatively, the objective probability for all (high wage) residents of randomizing between the manipu-
lating and the fair strategy.








1 |wH]=q, with q ∈ [0,1]
By observing the resident’s working hours, the migrant is able to revise his ex ante probabilities
Pr[wH] and Pr[wL]. More precisely:
a) If the resident chooses to work hL


























The information set I2 used by the migrant when t =2to revise probabilities includes as the
single salient piece of information the resident’s working hours during the ﬁrst period, I2 = {h1}.














1 ] ∈ [wL,0.5(wL + wH)].








2 > 0, (19)
to reach its highest value for q =1(when everybody works hL
1 , the migrant cannot revise prior
probabilities, therefore Pr[wH|hL
1 ]=P r [ wL|hL
1]=p).
b) If the resident chooses to work hH













1 ]=0 . (21)
11The expected value of the resident’s wage is simply:
E[wi|hH
1 ]=wH. (22)
Thus, the optimal amount of remittances (Eq. 13) is bigger if the resident chooses h1 = hL than
if he chooses h1 = hH.
3.4 The resident’s choice of working hours during the ﬁrst period
Given former developments, it turns out that when the resident is in a poor economic situation
(wi = wL), he will always choose to work the small amount of time (h1 = hL
1 ) : he does not
want the migrant to believe that he is well paid because he would then get less remittances. On
the other hand, if the resident is in a good economic situation (wi = wH), he will manipulate
migrant’s anticipations by choosing to work hL
1 with probability q, and will be honest by choosing
to work hH
1 with probability 1−q.11 Extreme cases q =0or q =1correspond to pure strategies.
In the following, we focus on the mixed strategy case q ∈ [0,1], which encompasses the two pure
strategies as particular situations.







In a ﬁrst step, we estimate Z(hL
1 ,w H).K n o w i n g t h a t hL
1 =0 .5(1 − A/wL),w ec a nw r i t et h e
resident’s ﬁrst-period utility as: U1 = U(c1(hL
1),h L
1 )=u1(hL
1 ,w H) with:
u1(hL
1 ,wH)=( wHhL
1 + A)(1 − hL
1) (24)
=0 .25(1 + A/wL)[wH(1 − A/wL)+2 A]. (25)
Then, we know that E[wi|hL
1 ]=wH q
1+q + wL 1
1+q. Thus, optimal remittances (Eq. 13) are:








11 The probability q is endogenous.

















wH(1 + q)2[βs(1 + q) − (1 − β)wL +( 1+βq)wH]2. (27)
In a second step, we calculate Z(hH
1 ,w H).W e k n o w t h a t hH




1 ,w H), with:
u1(hH
1 ,w H)=( wHhH




wH (A + wH)2. (28)
Knowing that E[wi|hH



















⇔ (1 + q)2 ¡
wH − wL¢ A2
(wL)2 =( 1 − β)[2βs(1 + q) − (1 − β)wL +( 1+2 βq + β)wH].(31)
The latter equation implicitly deﬁnes q as a function of the various parameters. It can be shown








(1 − β)(wL)2 +( 1− β)wL − (1 + 2βq + β)wH
#
. (32)




2β(1 + q)2(1 − β)
(wH − wL)[(A/wL)2(1 + q)2 +( 1− β)2]
> 0. (33)
Furthermore, by setting q =0and respectively q =1 , we get the inferior and superior wage
thresholds that separate the three types of equilibria:






(1 − β)(wL)2 +( 1− β)wL − (1 + β)wH
#
(34)








(1 − β)(wL)2 +( 1− β)wL − (1 + 3β)wH
#
. (35)






, it turns out that Z(hH
1 ,w H) >Z (hL
1 ,w H):i ti sn o tb e n e ﬁcial for residents
in a good economic situation to manipulate information (q =0 ). The equilibrium is separating:
each type of resident implements a speciﬁc action, either hL
1 or hH
1 , and this action signals his
type without ambiguity.
When s ∈ [s0,s 1], there can be manipulation (q ∈ [0,1]), the equilibrium is hybrid: while the
action hH
1 signals the migrant’s type, the action hL
1 does not.
When s>s 1, it can be shown that Z(hH
1 ,wH) <Z (hL
1,w H): all residents in a good eco-
nomic situation ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to manipulate information (q =1 ). The equilibrium is of the
pooling type: all residents, whatever their wage, choose the same action hL
1, migrants can infer no














Figure 1: Types of equilibria and the manipulation probability with respect to s
If s0 <w H <s 1, the separating equilibrium cannot occur. If s1 <w H, the only possible
equilibrium is the pooling one. In order to develop on the most general case, in the following we
assume that s0 >w H.
143.5 The migrant’s choice of working hours during the ﬁrst period
In order to conclude the analysis of individual strategies, we can analyze the migrant’s choice of




Σ =[ V (x1,τ1)]
(1−β) [U(E[c1|I1],h 1)]




with ∀t, xt = sτt + Bt, and B1 =0 ,B 2 = −T
with ∀t, E[ct|I1]=E[wi|I1]ht + Rt, and R1 = A,R2 = T
and E[wi|I1]=0 .5(wH + wL).
In this simple problem, it is easy to check that the optimal solution is τ∗
1 =0 .5.G i v e nt h e
assumption that the migrant gets no exogenous income (B1 =0 ) , the migrant’s working hours do
not depend on his expectations about the resident’s wage as determined at the beginning of the
game, E[wi|I1]. Since the latter is a constant, E[wi|I1]=0 .5(wH + wL),t h i ss i m p l i ﬁcation does
not modify the basic structure of the game.
4 Properties of the hybrid equilibrium
4.1 A welfare comparison
This subsection aims at providing a comparison in terms of welfare between the perfect and
the imperfect information case. In the case of perfect information, the resident subject to the
good economic situation cannot manipulate information because the migrant knows his wage.
Therefore, like in the separating equilibrium, each type of resident has a speciﬁc ﬁrst-period





where exponent P stands here for perfect information.
In the case of imperfect information, we have shown that some rich residents may implement






15where exponent I indicate imperfect information. The utility loss (in absolute value) of the poor
resident due to the the imperfection of information can be written:
ZP(hL
1,w L) − ZI(hL









wL (s + wL)2 (39)
and, given the expression of optimal remittances (Eq. 13) and the expected wage of the resident




















Since TI∗ = T ∗(E[wi|hL
1 ]) <TP∗ = T∗(wL), it is easy to see that:
u2(T∗(wL),w L) >u 2(T∗(E[wi|hL
1 ]),wL)
ZP(hL
1,w L) >Z I(hL
1,w L).
To sum up, under imperfect information, the resident subject to a bad economic situation (wi =
wL) (who cannot signal his type), undergoes a utility loss compared to the perfect information
case.
After some calculations presented in Appendix 1, the welfare loss due to imperfect information
can be expressed according only to q:
ZP(hL






















Finally, without going into details, we notice that imperfect information would generate a utility
gain for the rich resident (who get a higher amount of remittances than in the case of perfect
16information) and an ex post welfare loss for the migrant, because he makes his decisions based on
an inaccurate expected value of the resident’s wage; he would remit too much to a "rich" resident,
and too little to a "poor" one.
4.2 The equilibrium relationship between remittances and the migrant’s
wage
According to Eq. (13), optimal remittances depend on the migrant’s wage and on his evaluation
of the resident’s wage. But the probabilities that enable him to determine the resident’s expected
wage depend on his own wage, since the latter has a bearing on the resident’s behavior. More
precisely, a raise in the migrant’s wage s generates two opposite eﬀects: on the one hand, there is a
wealth eﬀect such that the migrant, richer, wishes to increase his remittances; on the other hand,
the rise in the amount remitted causes an increase in the probability of manipulation and thus in
the resident’s wage as expected by the migrant, who is then prompted to reduce his remittances.
These complex links can be better highlighted by studying the formal relationship between T





, we can write:
dT ∗
ds






























(1 + q)2 . This term is positive. Indeed,











1+q ∀(β,q). Remittances are an increasing function of the migrant’s wage: in this model,
the wealth eﬀect overrides the moral hazard eﬀect.
Finally, note that the resident’s working hours during the second period are a decreasing
function of remittances. Thus, the eﬀect of a raise in the migrant’s wage on the resident’s hours
supply is negative.
175 Equilibrium with strategic signaling
The former welfare analysis shows that when residents cannot reduce working hours h1 below the
perfect information lowest working time (hL
1) such as to signal their type, a poor resident incurs
a welfare loss as compared to a situation with perfect information. In this section we relax the
constraint on working hours, and allow the resident to adjust working hours strategically. Indeed,
according to the traditional argument (Vickers, 1986; Spence, 2002), the poor resident may try to
signal his real situation (unfavorable) by undercutting working hours and accepting a degradation
of his utility during the ﬁrst period, provided that the reduction will not be implemented by a
possible manipulator. If this form of strategic signaling is eﬀective, then the separating equilibrium
prevails.
Here, we are interested in signalization possibilities when rich residents do tend to cheat, i.e.
when s>s 0 (and q ∈ [0,1]). In order to study this problem formally, let us denote by ¯ h1 the
working hours which allow signalization, with ¯ h1 <h L
1 . If this policy of working hour reduction
exists, it must comply with two conditions.
Condition 1 or incentive constraint: signalization has to be eﬀective; in other words, it has to
dissuade the manipulator (who is inevitably in a favorable situation, wH) from choosing the same
strategy as the poor resident. A manipulator does not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to work ¯ h1 and, under
the separating conditions, to be considered without ambiguity as a poor resident, if his gains are
higher when he is honest (he then works hH
1 and signals his type):
Z(¯ h1,w H) <Z (hH
1 ,wH) (45)
u1(¯ h1,w H)+u2(T∗(wL),w H) <u 1(hH
1 ,w H)+u2(T∗(wH),wH). (46)
Condition 2 or participation constraint: signalization has to be proﬁtable for the poor resident.
If he undergoes the cost of reduced working hours during the ﬁrst period, his intertemporal utility
with signalization must nevertheless be higher than in the absence of signalization (and thus
18without cost during the ﬁrst period):
Z(¯ h1,wL) >Z (hL
1 ,w L) (47)
u1(¯ h1,w L)+u2(T∗(wL),wL) >u 1(hL
1,w L)+u2(T∗(E[wi|hL
1]),w L). (48)
Appendix 2 shows that Condition 1 is satisﬁed if:











2 > 0. (50)
Threshold z1 depends on s, but not on q, because in the separating equilibrium, q is null. Rational
residents will choose the highest working hours that guarantees signalization:




In Appendix 2, we prove that when s>s 0, ¯ h1 is always strictly inferior to hL
1. It implies that,
in this game, signalization by reduction of his working hours is always a possible strategy for a
resident in an unfavorable economic situation.
As for Condition 2, it is satisﬁed if (see Appendix 2):



















(Condition (42) enables us to make sure that z2 > 0 and dz2/dq > 0).
Knowing that ¯ h1 = hH
1 −
√
z1, we conclude that there is a signalization strategy by reduction




















2wHwL > 0. (55)
If there are cases where this condition is met, we can also highlight cases where it is impossible.
19For instance, when remitters are very altruistic (β → 1)t h et h r e s h o l dz1 is close to 0, while z2
is positive. Condition (55) is then met. The equilibrium with signalization prevails.
When β<1, we can study several signiﬁcant cases.
1st case : s close to s0.





z1 = ¯ h1 which is impossible because it was shown that ¯ h1 <h L
1. Thus, signalization by
modulating working hours is not proﬁtable when foreign wages are close to s0. This result seems
quite logical: when s is close to s0, nobody is cheating; then, signalization is unnecessary.
2nd case : s close to s1.







(wL)2 +0 .5(1 − β)2
¸
(56)





























The left term is decreasing in wH. Therefore, above a certain threshold, i.e. for wH high (compared
to wL), signalization is possible and proﬁtable for a resident in a diﬃcult economic situation.
3rd case : s>s 1.
When s>s 1,q=1;t h r e s h o l dz2 reaches its maximum in [z2]q=1 (because z2 is an increasing
function in q), while z1 is an increasing function in s. Even if the condition is satisﬁed for s1,a
higher wage will prove it wrong. When the migrant is paid a very high wage, signalization is not
longer proﬁtable for the resident in a diﬃcult economic situation. Remittances are so high that
everyone will always ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to cheat.
6C o n c l u s i o n
While several empirical studies have highlighted the positive eﬀect of migrants’ remittances on
poverty reduction in developing countries, some studies stressed out the fact that these remittances
20could bring about adverse eﬀects on recipients’ work eﬀort (Chami et al., 2003; Azam and Gubert,
2005). Our paper belongs to this strand of literature. It analyzes the impact of remittances on
residents’ labour supply in a signaling framework.
The model is cast as a two-period game between an altruistic migrant and a resident who
receives remittances, under the assumption of imperfect information concerning the resident’s
economic situation. In the Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium, a resident in a good economic situation
can try to manipulate the migrant’s expectations by adopting the same behavior as the resident
subject to a bad economic situation. The imperfection of information is prejudicial to the poor
resident, because, not being able to signal his type, he receives a reduced amount of remittances.
It is also prejudicial to the altruistic migrant who remits less (more) than he would like to a
poor (rich) resident. Therefore manipulation leads to a fall in the labor supply of the receiving
country that harms economic growth in the long run, if time saved by cheaters is not used in a
productive way (investment in human capital). It was shown that in some cases, a poor resident
can implement an expensive signaling strategy, which consists in drastically reducing his labor
supply. This strategy is likely to reinforce the income precarity of residents right when they meet
t h ew o r s te c o n o m i co u t l o o k .
The model is based on several assumptions, and some of them are simplifying. In particular,
we did not take into account the possibility for the migrant to save resources during the ﬁrst period
which he could consume during the second period. The problem that integrates the intertemporal
choice of consumption would require an even more complex formalization. Moreover, we did not
consider the possibility for the resident to be altruistic, possibility that should contain the scope
for manipulation without fully eliminating it. Finally, it could be interesting to study the virtues
of alternative contracting mechanisms between the migrant and the resident. For instance, if the
migrant could commit on the amount of remittances at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, this
would dissuade the rich resident from cheating. Yet this contract might be dominated, since it
implies less insurance for the poor resident.
Simpliﬁcations used in this paper are the price to pay to get a straightforward analysis of the
inﬂuence of imperfect information on the amount remitted on the one hand, and on labor supply
21on the other hand. Compared to existing theoretical models, this model submits an explanation of
remittances linked not only to the resident’s wage but also to the migrant’s wage. This relationship
between the migrant’s wage and the amount remitted is complex, because the traditional wealth
eﬀect can be partly oﬀset by the reinforcement of the incentive to cheat for the recipients. The
impact of international remittances on economic growth is also clearly identiﬁed, insofar as the
model builds on a traditional arbitrage between consumption and leisure, that allows us to bring
into the picture the optimal working time.
If it is diﬃcult to draw strong conclusions in terms of economic policy from a model which
remains very stylized, results call for a cautious assessment of the macroeconomic impact of private
intrafamily remittances. In the light of our analysis, any element which reduces the asymmetry
of information between migrants and recipients should contribute to improve the situation of the
poorest residents.
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wL (T∗ + wL)2
=
0.25
wL (βs− (1 − β)wL + wL)2 =
0.25β
2
wL (s + wL)2 (A.58)
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B Annexe 2. Signaling conditions
B.1 Condition 1
We study if signalisation by the poor resident through reduction of his ﬁrst-period labour supply
is possible.
We calculate:
u1(¯ h1,w H)=( wH¯ h1 + A)(1 − ¯ h1)
u1(hH
1 ,w H)=0.25
wH (A + wH)2
u1(¯ h1,w L)=( wL¯ h1 + A)(1 − ¯ h1)
u1(hL
1 ,w L)=0.25
wL (A + wL)2
Knowing that:
u2 = 0.25
wr (T∗ + wr)2








wH (βs− (1 − β)wL + wH)2
u2(T∗(wH),wH)=
0.25β2
wH (s + wH)2
u2(T∗(wL),w L)=0.25
wL (T∗ + wL)2 = 0.25
wL (βs− (1 − β)wL + wL)2 =
0.25β2




βs− (1 − β)
h
wH q





W ec a nt h e nr e w r i t eCondition 1 :
u2(T∗(wL),wH) − u2(T∗(wH),w H) ≤ u1(hH
1 ,w H) − u1(¯ h1,wH)
0.25
wH (βs− (1 − β)wL + wH)2 −
0.25β
2
wH (s + wH)2 ≤
0.25
wH (A + wH)2 − (wH¯ h1 + A)(1 − ¯ h1)
(1 − β)(wH − wL)[2βs− (1 − β)wL +( 1+β)wH] ≤ [(wH − A) − 2wH¯ h1]2
(1 − β)(wH − wL)[2βs− (1 − β)wL +( 1+β)wH] ≤ (2wH)2(
wH − A
2wH − ¯ h1)2
(1 − β)(wH − wL)[2β(s + wL)+( 1+β)(wH − wL)] ≤ 4(wH)2(hH
1 − ¯ h1)2, (B.64)
25where hH
1 − ¯ h1 > 0.
Let us denote:
z1 =
(1 − β)(wH − wL)[2β(s + wL)+( 1+β)(wH − wL)]
4(wH)2 > 0 (65)
Thus, separation is possible if there is a ¯ h1 ∈]0,h L
1[ such that:
(hH




The resident chooses the highest working hours possible:










































< (1 − β)(wH − wL)][2β(s + wL)+( 1+β)
¡
wH − wL¢
] ≡ Y (s) (B.67)
In this inequality, the right term denoted Y (s) is a function increasing in s.





(1−β)(wL)2(wH + wL)+( 1− β)wL − (1 + β)wH
i
.
Y (s0)=( wH − wL)2 A2
(wL)
2 (68)
In the hybrid equilibrium, s>s 0.T h u s :
¡
wH − wL¢2 A2
(wL)
2 = Y (s0) <Y(s), ∀s ⇔ ¯ h1 <h L
1,∀s. (69)
26B.2 Condition 2
We study if signalisation by the poor resident through reduction of his ﬁrst-period labour supply
is proﬁtable to him.
u1(¯ h1,w L)+u2(T∗(wL),w L) >u 1(hL
1 ,w L)+u2(T∗(E[wr]),w L)
4wL(wL¯ h1 + A)(1 − ¯ h1)+β




−4wLwL(¯ h1)2 +4 wL¯ h1(wL − A)+[ 4 wLA − (A + wL)2] > [βs−
1 − β
1+q
(qwH + wL)+wL]2 − β
2(s + wL)2 (B.70)
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(1 − β)qwH − (2β + q + βq)wL¤¾
(B.71)








(1−β)(wL)2 +( 1− β)wL − (1 + 2βq + β)wH
¸
.
W ec a nt h e nr e w r i t eCondition 2:
4(wL)2 ¡
hL












1 − ¯ h1
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Knowing that, according to Condition 1 (42), z2 > 0, and that hL




1 − ¯ h1
¢2
<z 2 ⇔ hL
1 −
√
z2 < ¯ h1. (74)
27ESSEC  
 




LISTE DES DOCUMENTS DE RECHERCHE DU CENTRE DE RECHERCHE DE L’ESSEC 
  (Pour se procurer ces documents, s’adresser au CENTRE DE RECHERCHE DE L’ESSEC) 
 
    LISTE OF ESSEC RESEARCH CENTER WORKING PAPERS 












04001  BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
  Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model 
 
04002 ALFANDARI  Laurent 
  Choice Rules Size Constraints for Multiple Criteria Decision Making 
 
04003  BOURGUIGNON Annick, JENKINS Alan 
  Management Accounting Change and the Construction of Coherence in Organisations: a Case Study 
 
04004  CHARLETY Patricia, FAGART Marie-Cécile, SOUAM Saïd 
Real Market Concentration through Partial Acquisitions 
 
04005 CHOFFRAY  Jean-Marie 
La révolution Internet 
 
04006  BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
The Paris Residential Market: Driving Factors and Market Behaviour 1973-2001 
 
04007  BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
Physical Real Estate: A Paris Repeat Sales Residential Index 
 
04008  BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
The Information Limit to Honest Managerial Behavior 
 
04009 BIZET  Bernard 
Public Property Privatization in France 
 
04010 BIZET  Bernard 
Real Estate Taxation and Local Tax Policies in France 
 
04011 CONTENSOU  François 
Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy 
04012  CHAU Minh, CONTENSOU François 
Profit-Sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device 
 
04013 REZZOUK  Med 




05001 VRANCEANU  Radu 
The Ethical Dimension of Economic Choices 
 
05002  BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
A PCA Factor Repeat Sales Index (1973-2001) to Forecast Apartment Prices in Paris (France) 
 
05003 ALFANDARI  Laurent 
Improved Approximation of the General Soft-Capacitated Facility Location Problem 
 
05004 JENKINS  Alan 
Performance Appraisal Research: A Critical Review of Work on “the Social Context and Politics of 
Appraisal” 
 
05005  BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty 
 
05006 BOARI  Mircea 
Biology & Political Science. Foundational Issues of Political Biology 
 
05007 BIBARD  Laurent 
Biologie et politique 
 
05008  BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 






06001  CAZAVAN-JENY Anne, JEANJEAN Thomas 
Levels of Voluntary Disclosure in IPO prospectuses: An Empirical Analysis 
 
06002  BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
Monte Carlo Simulations versus DCF in Real Estate Portfolio Valuation 
 
06003  BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale 
 
06004  FOURCANS André, VRANCEANU Radu 
Is the ECB so Special? A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis 
 
06005  NAIDITCH Claire, VRANCEANU Radu 
Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation 
 
06006 MOTTIS  Nicolas 
Bologna: Far from a Model, Just a Process for a While… 
 
06007 LAMBERT  Brice 
Ambiance Factors, Emotions and Web User Behavior: A Model Integrating and Affective and Symbolical 
Approach 
 
06008  BATISTA Catia, POTIN Jacques 
Stages of Diversification and Capital Accumulation in an Heckscher-Ohlin World, 1975-1995 
 
06009 TARONDEAU  Jean-Claude 
Strategy and Organization Improving Organizational Learning 
06010 TIXIER  Daniel 
Teaching Management of Market Driven Business Units  Using Internet Based Business Games 
 
06011 COEURDACIER  Nicolas 
Do Trade Costs in Goods Market Lead to Home Bias in Equities? 
 06012 AVIAT  Antonin, COEURDACIER Nicolas 
The Geography of Trade in Goods and Asset Holdings 
 
06013 COEURDACIER  Nicolas, GUIBAUD Stéphane 
International Portfolio Diversification Is Better Than You Think 
 
06014 COEURDACIER  Nicolas, GUIBAUD Stéphane 
A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Imperfectly Integrated Financial Markets 
 
06015  DUAN Jin-Chuan, FULOP Andras 
Estimating the Structural Credit Risk Model When Equity Prices Are Contaminated by Trading Noises 
 
06016 FULOP  Andras 
Feedback Effects of Rating Downgrades 
 
06017 LESCOURRET  Laurence, ROBERT Christian Y. 
Preferencing, Internalization and Inventory Position 
 
06018  BOURGUIGNON Annick, SAULPIC Olivier, ZARLOWSKI Philippe 
Management Accounting Change in the Public Sector: A French Case Study and a New Institutionalist 
Perspective 
 
06019  de BEAUFORT Viviane 
One Share – One Vote, le nouveau Saint Graal ? 
 
06020 COEURDACIER  Nicolas, MARTIN Philippe 
The Geography of Asset Trade and the Euro: Insiders and Outsiders 
 
06021  BESANCENOT Damien, HUYNH Kim, VRANCEANU Radu 
The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective 
 INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES
AND RESIDENTS' LABOUR SUPPLY





















































centre de recherche / RESEARCH CENTER
AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH
BP 50105 CERGY
95021 CERGY PONTOISE CEDEX
FRANCE
TéL. 33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
FAX 33 (0)1 34 43 30 01
research.center@essec.fr
essec business school.
établissements privés d’enseignement supérieur,
association loi 1901,
accréditéS aacsb international - the association 
TO ADVANCE COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, 
accrédités EQUIS - the european quality improvement system,
affiliés à la chambre de commerce et d’industrie
de versailles val d’oise - yvelines.
Pour tous renseignements :
• Centre de Recherche/Research Center
Tél. 33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
research.center@essec.fr













couv_dr07001_1302071100.qxp  13/02/2007  11:44  Page 1